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Helping Georgia?
By IRAKLY G. ARESHIDZE(1) 
Three factors determine Georgia's political development: the nature of the country's 
relations with Russia and with the United States; the weakness of the Georgian state; 
and the struggle to succeed President Eduard Shevardnadze. Each of these factors has 
been significantly influenced by the Bush administration's decision to send US military 
advisors to train and equip a unit of the Georgian army. Many Georgians view America's 
renewed commitment as a means of protecting their independence and territorial 
integrity from Russian threats, and have placed high hopes on the mission, which 
constitutes a very significant step forward, but only an initial one. It must be followed by 
expansion of US-Georgian military cooperation, and a strengthening of other political 
institutions. Finally, the US assistance bolsters Shevardnadze, but what impact this will 
have on Georgia's domestic scene remains an open question. 
The US Train and Equip Mission in Georgia
In February the Pentagon announced a plan to deploy American soldiers to train 
approximately 1,200 men in Georgia to help fight the war against terrorism. Ostensibly, 
the trained forces are to combat terrorists in Georgia's Pankisi Gorge, a region that 
borders Chechnya and is the home to the Kisti, ethnically Chechen Georgian citizens, 
and thousands of Russian citizens who have fled the Chechen war. Some analysts 
believe that Pankisi also is home to Chechen rebels, including the forces of Ruslan 
Gelaev. Over the last two years, there have been several hostage-taking incidents in 
which the victims were taken to Pankisi Gorge; all were resolved peacefully, usually with 
the participation of local Kisti elders.
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Russia, which regards virtually all Chechen fighters as terrorists, repeatedly used 
allegations that Chechen fighters were present in Pankisi as a means of pressuring 
Georgia. This pressure intensified dramatically after 11 September, and Russian planes 
bombed Georgia in November 2001 and February 2002. US President George W. Bush 
continuously has reaffirmed his commitment to Georgia's territorial integrity, and the 
administration had warned Russia not to invade Georgia with Pankisi as a pretext. 
However, Georgians and Americans knew all too well that words alone would not deter 
Russia forever. According to Georgian officials, Bush assured Shevardnadze of 
substantive assistance in dealing with Pankisi during the latter's visit to Washington in 
October 2001. Georgian diplomat David Soumbadze told The Washington Post that 
Shevardnadze "was promised there would be a program of training and even providing 
some equipment. There was no detailed discussion about when and how."(2) According 
to a number of confidential but reliable Georgian sources, securing financing for the 
mission was expected to take a long time, since money was tied up in various 
appropriations. Connecting the training operation in Georgia to Operation Enduring 
Freedom was seen as one way to speed up financial support.
In December, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld visited Tbilisi and discussed 
potential US military assistance. In early February, the US interim charge d'affaires, 
Philip Remler, told Georgian media that terrorists connected to al Qaeda might be hiding 
in Pankisi.(3) This and similar claims gave the Bush administration a way to link the 
mission to train Georgian forces with the global war on terrorism.
When American media first reported the planned US deployment in Georgia on 
February 27, 2002, the majority of the Georgian population was ecstatic; it seemed as if 
D-Day No. 2 was about to unfold. A poll taken in Tbilisi by Georgian Opinion Research 
Business International (GORBI) after the Pentagon announcement showed that 51 
percent of the population supported Georgia's cooperation with the US, while 27 percent 
favored working with Russia -- this notwithstanding the fact that 70 percent expected 
Georgia-Russian relations to suffer as a result, and results from a previous poll 
(December 2001) which showed 46 percent of Georgians wishing to see the country 
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oriented toward Russia, compared to 13 percent supporting a pro-American orientation. 
(The dramatic drop in America's rating in 2001 was explained by Georgians' perception 
that America was supporting failed reform policies.)(4) 
US-Georgian and Russian-Georgian Relations
Surprisingly, Russian President Vladimir Putin reacted mildly to the American 
announcement, calling it "no tragedy." "Why should they [the U.S. forces] be in Central 
Asia and not in Georgia?" he asked.(5) However, most Russian officials were less 
relaxed. Foreign Minister Sergei Ivanov was quoted widely as saying that "we think it 
could further aggravate the situation in the region, which is difficult as it is." Boris 
Nemtsov, leader of the supposedly liberal forces in the Russian Duma, declared that 
"Georgia's neighbors are not the Americans, but Russia, where hundreds of thousands 
of Georgian citizens work." He also claimed that Shevardnadze was pursuing "an 
absolutely crazy policy by orienting the country only towards the U.S."(6) The Russian 
Duma discussed the situation in Georgia for days, considering, among other questions, 
whether Russia should recognize the independence of secessionist Abkhazia in 
response to the American deployment. Time declared that Moscow was "hopping 
mad."(7)
The Russian reaction had little to do with this particular American deployment. The $64 
million that America will spend on this mission is unlikely to create even a semblance of 
a strong army which could secure Pankisi on its own, much less pose a threat to Russia 
in any way, even in Abkhazia. However, imperialists in Moscow cannot bear the 
symbolic meaning of the American action and its long-term implications. There has 
been, for example, much talk in Washington, Tbilisi and Moscow about the possibility 
that a Western military base will be built in Georgia. While this is unlikely to happen in 
the immediate future, the train and equip mission could be a precursor. Indeed, the train 
and equip program will only have real impact if it is followed by other, more serious US 
military assistance to Georgia; this is a truth that all three sides (Georgians, Americans 
and Russians) know very well.
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The symbolic nature of the American mission cannot be overstated either. 
Shevardnadze has been slowly, meticulously, yet very successfully, taking Georgia out 
of the Russian orbit, toward America. The US mission announcement was the latest and 
clearest sign of the success of his policy. As a result, America's decision to help Georgia 
has strengthened the president in domestic politics, and helped him escape apparent 
political isolation. What the US involvement will mean for the strengthening of the 
Georgian state, however, is not fully clear. 
The Weakness of the Georgian State
In recent years Georgia has been called often, inaccurately, a "failed state."(8) Georgia 
is an example of a "weak state," which Ghia Nodia says is a country "that meets the 
minimalist functions of a state through all or in most of its territory but is seriously 
challenged in its capacity to implement some major state functions and policies that 
have been reasonably well defined by political actors and are expected from its own 
population."(9) Georgia does not control two significant portions of its territory -- 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia -- and only barely controls Adjaria. The regime also is 
unable to meet many responsibilities assigned to it by Georgia's current Constitution-
such as collection of tax revenue, protection of natural political rights and prosecution of 
criminals.
These difficulties notwithstanding, the Georgian state today is stronger than it was 
seven years ago:
An armed militia, Mkhedrioni, which played a key role in the ouster of Georgia's first 
freely elected president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, no longer roams the country harassing 
the population;
There is no longer a threat of civil war;
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Some basic institutions (such as the media) of a stable and just political regime have 
developed;
The economy has largely stabilized, and some legitimate business is able to prosper, 
though much of the economy remains in the extralegal, not-reported sector; and,
A small middle class has developed and is growing.
Considering this evidence, calling Georgia a failed state in the sense of some African 
countries (e.g., Somalia) ignores the dramatic improvements that have been brought 
about during President Shevardnadze's tenure. Yet it is impossible to ignore the fact that 
these accomplishments are extremely fragile, and are very dependent on 
Shevardnadze's personality. If Shevardnadze were to leave office suddenly, Georgia 
easily could return to a state of civil war, as in the early 1990s.
Creating a real army, a process that only begins with the American train and equip 
program, can play a critical role in strengthening the Georgian state. However, this 
process also requires a social contract amongst the citizens and with the political 
community. A social contract allows citizens to recognize the regime's authority to rule 
and enables the regime to recognize the right of citizens to be free in all those aspects 
of life which they did not concede to the government. In Georgia, citizens view the 
government as an entity to which they owe no allegiance and with which they have no 
connection. This can be partly explained by the demise of civil society in the post-
Communist land, as Charles Fairbanks has argued convincingly.(10) However, there is 
a more immediate reason-the mode through which the Georgian Constitution, in which 
the social contract is generally enshrined, was written and developed. To serve as a 
social contract, the Constitution requires consent from those over whom it is to govern 
and it must conform to the mores of the citizens. In Georgia, the granting of consent 
never took place-the Constitution was written in 1995 without any discussion or dialogue 
among the population, and the population never ratified it-nor does it correspond to the 
historical traditions of the Georgian people.
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The best, and the only, way to strengthen the Georgian state is to begin a political 
dialogue that can lead to the development of a social contract among the Georgian 
citizens. This will result in an agreement on what citizens expect from government, and 
what sort of obligations and responsibilities they wish to place on the regime. 
Furthermore, such a dialogue will lead to an agreement on what the citizens are willing 
to pay, both financially and politically, to give the government the powers to meet its 
obligations. This process will ultimately lead to a new Constitution for Georgia. Only 
such a process will help ensure a safe and successful transition of power in 2005, when 
Shevardnadze leaves office. 
The Post-Shevardnadze Succession
There are currently three forces competing for power: Revival, a political block led by 
Aslan Abashidze; the so-called "Reformist Team" of Zurab Zhvania and Michael 
Saakashvili; and a political party called New Rights, whose principal leader is David 
Gamkrelidze. The local government elections, which might take place this summer (they 
are scheduled for June, but have been postponed before), and the parliamentary 
elections scheduled for 2003, will serve as precursors to the presidential race in 2005. 
Parties that win these races will be seen automatically as having the leading candidates 
to succeed Shevardnadze, yet ultimately, victory will be dependent on their ability to 
work with, rather than against, the president.
The Revival block, and its leader Abashidze, who governs Adjaria, possess financial 
strength and guaranteed votes in Adjaria, where free elections do not take place. As a 
result, Revival will remain an important part of the parliament after the next elections. 
However, analysts suggest that Abashidze fully understands that Tbilisi's elite will never 
accept him as president and maintains a national political presence only to ensure that 
the authorities do not threaten his rule in Adjaria.
Zhvania-Saakashvili's Reformist Team owes its role in Georgian politics to 
Shevardnadze, but the former speaker of parliament and former justice minister broke 
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with the president about a year ago, possibly because they realized that Shevardnadze 
would never anoint either of them as his successor. Zhvania is now fighting for the 
control of Citizens Union of Georgia (CUG), the former governing party that 
Shevardnadze created in the early 1990s, and probably will have to join Saakashvili's 
National Movement for Democratic Reform, where he will be forced to play second 
fiddle. Saakashvili's popularity today, meanwhile, is built on radical populism, with ideas 
that remind many Georgians who are over 30 of communism, such as a call for a law 
mandating confiscation of illegally acquired property which leaves the burden of proof 
on the accused individual.
The New Rights Party, whose political base builds on a growing middle class, 
entrepreneurs and a strong regional network, arose in 1999, when most of Georgia's big 
businessmen withdrew their support for CUG and started to build their own political 
force. Their key strengths are financial resources, a leadership untainted by corruption 
and a unique ideology. Unlike any other force in Georgia, the New Rights Party 
advocates classical liberal policies-minimal government, maximum freedom, less 
government regulations, more individual responsibility. The party is also well served by 
the fact that it does not have a leading personality, unlike Zhvania-Saakashvili's or 
Abashidze's teams, but is instead built around a political philosophy. Its biggest 
weakness is the political youth of its leaders. However, with the presidential elections 
not scheduled until 2005, they have an opportunity to gain significant political 
experience by taking a leading role in lawmaking in parliament, as they have been over 
the last year, and by building close relationships with the political elite in the West, 
especially the United States, before any of them vies for the top office.
Each of these forces is now looking for support from Shevardnadze, whose 
indispensability to Georgia was only confirmed by America's new military mission. 
Whom he will endorse is not clear, but his move might very well determine the future of 
Georgia's democracy. If the president continues to use various political forces in a game 
against each other, it is unlikely that progress toward a strong and democratic 
succession can be achieved. However, unlike Russia's Boris Yel'tsin, if Shevardnadze 
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feels secure enough to allow a democratic group to grow, (something like the "New 
Right") to grow, the country might achieve a real political transition in 2005 which will 
finally move it toward building liberal democracy in Georgia.
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